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Has India Addressed Its Farmers' Woes? A Story of
Plant Protection Issues
SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN* & JAMIE MAYER O'SHIELDS**
At the time of independence, Winston Churchill referred to India as a mere
"geographic expression."' India's emergence as a strong economy is the result of
rigorous planning to balance economic needs with social justice. From a country
where everything "foren" was shunned, the Indian Yatra is now ready to take on
foreign ownership in all fields, including agriculture. As a mark of its willingness
to liberalize, India attained membership to the WTO by taking on a package of
trade obligations. "Trade obligations" are obligations of nations arising out of an
agreement signed in 1992 to establish and create membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).2 As part of the WTO's objectives to promote trade,
minimum standards for intellectual property (IP) protection were established
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)3 as a means to reduce barriers to international trade.
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1. Larry Arnn, Churchill's Greatness (3)-The Gandhi Factor 108 FINEsT HouR (Autumn 2000), available
at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=354. Arm explains that Churchill also be-
lieved that the people of India were incapable of self-government at the time. Churchill insisted that India was
divided among people of different tribes and religions, some of whom meant violence upon the others. Id.
2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND, 33 I.L.M 181 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]. The WTO consists of countries that
are party to the Uruguay Round Agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI'). See 4 Pat.
L. Fundamentals § 21:18 (2d ed.).
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
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India, with a view to fulfill its TRIPS obligations, passed the Protection of
Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act of 20014 (PPVFA). The Act represents a
sui generis attempt to balance the rights of farmers and breeders, considering the
huge farming population in the country. The term sui generis refers to systems
engineered to meet the unique needs of a particular country or nation. The
TRIPS agreement blesses such a form of protection for plant varieties by
deviating from the norm of harmonizing IP rights.6 Thus, Article 27.3 of TRIPS
embodies flexibility to protect plant varieties via "patents or by an effective sui
generis system or by any combination thereof."
7
Between developing and developed member nations, however, the flexibility
of Article 27.3 has been a source of confusion. Developed nations construe a
model codified as the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV)8 as the minimum standard for establishing a sui generis system.9
Though UPOV is an example of a sui generis system of protection, developing
nations, including India, refuse to treat it as the only option or as setting minimum
standards for TRIPS compliance on the grounds that it fails to adequately protect
farmers' rights."' UPOV, developing nations believe, is more suited to developed
nations, where farming is essentially large scale and dominated by breeders and
seed industries." In developing nations, modernization and mechanization are
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The TRIPS agreement, signed as part of the agreements that
established the WTO, introduced intellectual property rules to the multilateral trading system for the first time.
The WTO is the only global organization dealing with the rules of trade among nations. The WTO was created
by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Introductory
Note, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See
also Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
4. The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, No. 53 of 2001; INDIA CODE (2001) available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=200153. (Hereinafter, PPVFA). The President of India has assented
to the PPVFA but the enactment has not come into force as of January 2007.
5. Dr. Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 785, 790 (2003).
6. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.
7. Id.
8. The term UPOV refers to the Union for Plant Variety Protection, a convention that was first signed in 1961
and later amended in 1972 and 1991. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 33
U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109 [hereinafter UPOV 1961]; revised by 33 U.S.T. 2703 (1978) [hereinafter UPOV
1978]; revised by 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (1991) [hereinafter UPOV].
9. Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN), For a Full Review of TRIPS 273(b), Mar. 2000,
http://www.grain.org/briefings-files/tripsfeb00.pdf [hereinafter GRAIN briefing]; Int'l Union for the Prot. of
New Varieties of Plants, Position Paper, The Notion of Breeder and Common Knowledge in Plant Variety Prot.
Sys. Based Upon The UPOV Convention, Apr. 19, 2002; see also Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The
Tension Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L.
193,203 (2002).
10. See generally Srividyha Ragavan, Of Plant Variety Protection, Agricultural Subsidies and the WTO,
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION WEALTh Vol. 4 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
11. See Ratakar Adhikari and Kamalesh Adhikari, UPOV Faulty Agreement and Coercive Practices, S.
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exceptions rather than rules in the cultivation centric style of life. Hence,
developing nations construe the term sui generis as allowing them the discretion
to determine the type and design of plant protection regime. 12 Such a construc-
tion of the term sui generis has enabled developing nations to promote innovative
plant breeding while preserving national objectives like protecting biodiversity,
traditional farming, and food security. 3 For developing nations, the important
incentive was the ability to weigh the benefits of Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) in
the context of socio-economic issues. That is, PBR's ability to increase foreign
investments and consumer choice in agricultural commodities had to be viewed
in the background of unique national concerns like its effect on local farmers or
biodiversity. Consequently, developing countries felt a heightened need to
introduce public interest exceptions that could balance the benefits from trade
with national welfare issues.
In enacting the PPVFA, India, like other developing nations, took advantage of
the Article 27.3 flexibilities by embracing a sui generis regime. India's PPVFA
was noticed by the rest of the world for two reasons. First, it highlighted the
complexity of farming in the developing world, which requires balancing the
interests of the variety of actors involved in agricultural trade.' 4 Second, flaws
notwithstanding, the PPVFA presented an alternative model to UPOV for poorer
nations. Presumably, the PPVFA was passed because India hoped to benefit by
introducing PBRs. With a view to compliment the PPVFA, the Ministry of
Agriculture introduced a Seeds Bill in 2004 to encourage seed trade to promote
the seed industry, boost exports, and protect seed quality.15 While TRIPS does not
require governments to regulate seed trade, the passing of the PPVFA perhaps
necessitated a review of the existing framework governing seed trade.
This paper examines whether the PPVFA, along with the proposed Seeds Bill,
fulfills India's obligations under Article 27.3 of TRIPS. Further, the paper
analyzes the benefits India is likely to derive from fulfilling these obligations.
Part I examines Article 27.3 of TRIPS to analyze the constituents of the
"effectiveness" requirement of the article. In analyzing whether the sui generis
system in UPOV is effective, Part II argues that UPOV's effectiveness is
AsIA WATCH ON TRADE, ECON. & ENV'T, KATHMANDu, 2003, at 2, 6, available at http://www.sawtee.org/pdf/
upov%20policy%20brief.pdf (arguing that developed nations' farmers constitute merely "one to five percent of
their total population.") [hereinafter SAWTEE brief].
12. Id. at 1.
13. See generally Press Release, Action Aid Int'l and Gene Campaign, Why We Oppose UPOV and Why it is
Urgent That Developing Countries Enact Their Own Plant Variety Protection Laws, (Oct. 17, 2002) (on file with
author).
14. The three actors considered in this paper are: (1) breeders, (2) indigenous farmers, and (3) indigenous
farming communities.
15. The Seeds Bill, 2004, No. 52, Acts of Parliament, 2004, http://rajyasabha.nic.in/bills-ls-rs/2004/
LII_2004.pdf (last visited Sep. 26,2007) [hereinafter Seeds Bill 2004]. The Seeds Bill 2004 is an enactment by
India's Ministry of Agriculture. The Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on Dec. 9, 2004, and has been
referred to the Committee on Agriculture.
20071
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
questionable considering that it has: (1) diluted eligibility standards, (2) exagger-
ated scope of breeders' rights, and (3) limited exceptions to breeders' rights. Part
III, in examining the effectiveness of PPVFA and the proposed Seeds Bill,
concludes that India should refrain from enacting the Seeds Bill and instead
strengthen the PPVFA to achieve certain national objectives by plugging existing
loopholes. The conclusion highlights that PBRs per se can potentially lead to
increased research in agriculture despite the resulting privatization and monopo-
lization. However, any benefits that Indians may potentially derive remains
questionable until India pressures the WTO forum to aggressively reduce
agricultural subsidies. Otherwise, introduction of PBRs in a market that is closed
by prevailing subsidy levels could lead India towards a path of food insecurity.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 27.3 OF TRIPS
[Miembers shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 16
By leaving "plant varieties" undefined, TRIPS implies effective protection of
all plant varieties. Members can choose any one of the three regimes: (1) patents,
(2) a sui generis system, or (3) a combination of both patents and the sui generis
system to protect plant varieties. 17 Without setting substantive standards of
protection, Article 27.3 narrows members' choice of regime through the effective-
ness requirement.1 8 The open-ended language of the article creates a flexible
standard of protection sympathetic to developing nations' socio-economic priori-
ties, provided the effectiveness requirement is satisfied. The flexibility presents a
range of possibilities from systems like the plant patent regime of the United
States or specific variety protection systems of the European Union, to the
possibility of customized plant protection regimes suited to the needs of develop-
ing nations. 19
Effective Protection: The term "effective," which is the only standard outlined
in TRIPS for protecting plants, is left undefined. Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, which gives the interpretive rules for undefined terms in interna-
tional agreements, requires treaties to be read in light of their objectives and
purposes.2 ° Such an objective-based reading of an agreement is supported by the
terms of the subsequent clarification made to TRIPS, generally known as the
16. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.3.
17. Id. See also Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual
Property Perspective, 23 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 229, 263-64 (1998).
18. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.3.
19. Joseph Straus, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private
Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 91, 100-01
(1998).
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Doha Declaration. 21 The Declaration states, "the TRIPS Council shall be guided
by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement and shall take fully into account the development dimen-
sion. ... 22 Similarly, the Declaration on Public Health asserts that, "[iun apply-
ing the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object and purpose
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.,
23
The provisions of TRIPS, including the effectiveness obligation in Article 27,
should be read in light of the agreement objectives.
The objectives of TRIPS in Article 7 details that enforcement of IP mecha-
nisms should "contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge .... ,24 Article 7 requires technology to be
promoted "in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to balance
of rights and obligations.' 25 Thus, the objective of TRIPS is to balance members'
[P protection obligations with their right to promote social and economic
welfare.26 The principles under which the objectives of Article 7 work are
discussed in Article 8.27 Entitled Principles, Article 8 recognizes each members'
right to adopt public health and public interest measures, provided they are
consistent with the provisions of TRIPS.28 An objective-based interpretation of
TRIPS necessitates the Article 7 requirement that [P mechanisms balance
members' rights and obligations be read alongside the Article 8 principles, which
vest members with the right to prioritize their national public interests.29
In light of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, the effectiveness of a plant protection
regime established under Article 27 must be judged by its ability to accommodate
local and national welfare and economic goals. Such a reading of the effective-
ness requirement fits more comfortably with the other sub-sections of Article 27,
which provide that members may choose to protect biological or microbiological
materials. Member flexibility to establish an effective system increases when using a
21. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, 17, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
22. Id. 19.
23. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health of 14 Nov. 2001,1 5(a)
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (recognizing the correct interpretation of TRIPS includes the
flexibility to enable countries to protect both intellectual property and the public health).
24. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 8.
28. Id. ("Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
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national yardstick. Therein, perhaps, lies the benefit of Article 27.3's use of the
expression "an effective sui generis" system as opposed to the effective system.
For developing nations using a national yardstick, an effective system would
provide adequate rewards to stimulate successful research and development of
plant varieties without compromising national welfare goals.3° While promoting
agricultural trade is an important goal for developing nations, it generally trails
behind the more imminent goal of food security. With such a national focus, a
developing country can structure a regime "expressly reserving the right of a
farmer who legitimately purchased protected seeds to save enough from her
harvest to replant her fields the following season.,, 3 1 Similarly, biodiversity
protection and sustainable development of indigenous communities need not be
sidelined to successfully implement TRIPS.32 The bottom line is that countries
that associate over-emphasized breeders' rights with loss of genetic diversity and
shifting agriculture trade from farmers to multinational corporations can structure
a sui generis option that best serves their local needs.33 Other countries, like
developed nations, can fashion a system to promote breeders exclusively as a
means to promote agricultural trade.
The effectiveness of the system will not be compromised by any one of the
choices above, provided the system vests sufficient protection. The system's
sufficiency lies in providing breeders' rights without sidelining farmers or
compromising national priorities.34 Unlike the TRIPS patent regime, whose
ability to cater to individual national goals remains questionable, the inbuilt
flexibility in the sui generis alternative in Article 27.3 allows each country to
structure unique plant protection regimes. In doing so, all nations have to
appreciate that both over-protection and under-protection detrimentally affect
trade, and would therefore fail the sufficiency test. This is because over-
protection of breeders' rights would affect trade in developing nations and could
lead to food security issues if farmers are sidelined. 35 At the same time,
inadequate protection of breeders' rights can also erode the incentive to inno-
30. Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the
TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249, 286 (2003).
31. Heald, supra note 30, at 287.
32. GRAIN Briefing supra note 9.
33. Press Release, Gene Campaign, Oppose UPOVI Save Farmers!, http://genecampaign.org/Publication/
FreePublication/OPPOSEUPOV !SAVEFARMERS !.pdf.
34. Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New Treaty Preserves Global
Food Security and Strengthens Farmers' Rights: UNCTAD Meeting Discusses Implications, available at
http://rO.unctad.org/trade.env/testl/meetings/plants/pressrelease2itpgrfa.doc (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
35. The expression that "farmers would be sidelined" does not mean that farmers would leave their land idle.
See generally Impact of PVP Laws: Findings from some of the few studies conducted, GRAIN Document, 2002,
available at, http://grain.org/docs/pvp-laws-impact-02-02-en.pdf. (highlighting statistics from developed na-
tions indicating that corporate breeders tend to use the protection regime more effectively). Instead, the
protection regime would result in increased dependence on breeders, thus, sidelining the current role of farmers
in developing nations.
[Vol. 20:97
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vate.36 After all, the importance of innovative plant breeding cannot be dis-
counted in addressing food security issues.
Viewed from this angle, out of the menu of offerings found under Article 27.3
of TRIPS, a sui generis regime creates the ability to associate national welfare
requirements with plant protection - an association otherwise lacking in the
formal patent mechanism. 37 It is because of this benefit that several developing
nations have chosen to satisfy their TRIPS obligations via sui generis systems.38
As of March 2000, twenty-one out of forty-seven developing country members of
WTO had introduced a sui generis form of plant variety protection.39
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UPOV REGIME
Historically, the genesis of UPOV can be traced to the breeding industry. In the
early 1900s, the breeding industry furthered the idea of PBRs and lobbied for
enhanced protection in exchange for quality of seeds.4° Although Europe wit-
nessed a strong sentiment against plant variety protection for fear of creating
monopolization over food, national certification schemes provided for breeders'
rights.4" Meanwhile, at the invitation of the French government, twelve western
European nations met to agree on a unified mechanism to promote seed trade.4 2
Protecting plant varieties, the signatories envisioned, would prevent rather than
promote monopolization over new plant varieties. 3 Consequently, the national
certification schemes for providing breeders' rights were integrated into UPOV
in 1961, with the specific objective of encouraging private sector commercial
breeding.44 Although UPOV originally attempted to distinguish itself from
patents due to the European sentiment against patenting plant varieties, the
UPOV conventions have been styled akin to the patent regimes and based on
Western IP philosophy to provide incentives for long-term breeding activities.45
36. Jim Chen & Drew Kershen, LAW, AGRICULTURE, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, 63 (2005) ("[W]hen a subsequent
user of agricultural technology developed by another simply applies it without paying the inventor and without
enhancing the technology we can easily perceive how this sort of expropriation could erode incentives to
develop technology.").
37. See generally David Vaver, Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal, 11 INT'L J.L. &
INFo. TECH. 286, 293 (2003) (highlighting some of the flexibilities under TRIPS article 27.3).
38. GRAIN briefing, supra note 9.
39. Id.
40. See Andre Heitz, The History of the UPOV Convention and the Rationale for Plant Breeders'Rights,
1991 Seminar on the Nature and Rationale for the Protection of Plant Varieties Under the UPOV Convention
25-26 (1994).
41. See JUsTICE RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTs
LAW 1-8 (1959) (quoting Lord Parker's address to the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents).
42. Heitz, supra note 40, at 33.
43. Philippe Cullet, Plant Variety Protection in Africa: Towards Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, 45
J.AFRICAN L. 97, 99 (2001); see also Heitz, supra note 40, at 34.
44. UPOV, supra note 8; see also Press Release, Action Aid, Plant breeders' rights and food security, (Mar.
2000).
45. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of Plants'Genetic Resources, 11
2007]
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The UPOV Convention, for instance, sought to promote "equity between breed-
ers, authors and inventors" in order to develop seed trade.46 To date, UPOV
retains its original quality as an instrument of the breeders. The subsequent
revisions of the Convention in 1978 and later in 1991 increased the scope of
breeders' rights.47 UPOV's bias towards breeders, however, has resulted in
developing nations' skepticism against adopting the model as the choice sui
generis system.48
UPOV's bias towards breeders does not affect its stature as a model sui generis
system. Several developed nations prefer to fashion a sui generis regime of plant
protection sympathetic to breeders. However, the 1) low standards for eligibility;
2) excessive rights for breeders; and 3) inadequate exceptions to breeders' rights,
discussed below, cause the 1991 UPOV model to provide insufficient and
imbalanced protection. Consequently, the following section asserts that the 1991
UPOV model fails the effectiveness test of Article 27.3 of TRIPS.
A. ELIGIBILITY FOR PROTECTION
UPOV vests breeders' rights over uniform, stable, new, and distinct varieties.49
Each of the eligibility requirements, detailed below, are based on exactly the
same premise as IP rights, but have a lower threshold for protection. The low
standard for eligibility, the following discussion argues, can result in vesting
rights over miniscule innovations that can potentially shift plants in the public
domain to the private domain.
1. UPOV's Novelty Requirements:
Article 6 of UPOV deems a variety as "new," if, "at the date of filing of the
application for a breeders' right, propagating or harvested material of the variety
has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to others.... by or with the consent of
the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety."'50 Prior sale or disposal of
the application material is the standard for determining novelty of the application
material. For instance, the standard excludes public knowledge, prior cultivation,
and limited publication from affecting novelty. The standard for novelty in
UPOV tracks the same standard for patentability of inventions. Hence, the
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 585,610 (2003).
46. Heitz, supra note 40, at 34.
47. UPOV, supra note 8; see generally UPOV Conventions of 1961 and 1978, http://www.upov.org/en/
publications/conventions/index.html.
48. Press Release, GRAIN, Beyond UPOV. Examples of developing countries preparing non-UPOV "sui
generis " plant variety protection schemes for compliance with TRIPS, (July, 1999) http://www.grain.org/briefings/
?id = 127.
49. UPOV, supra note 8.
50. Id. at art. 6. The application material should not be sold with the breeder's consent in the country of
application for one year before the date of application, or four years in any other country.
[Vol. 20:97
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standard is limited to sale or disposal in territory-plants that have not been sold
or disposed of would still be considered new even though the plant has been
subject to activities like publication that do not make the plant novel in common
parlance."1
Similarly, farmers' exchanging seeds for non-commercial or experimental
purposes will not defeat novelty, since public knowledge of a variety does not
preclude classifying a variety as new.52 To that extent, known varieties may still
become eligible for protection as new. That is, UPOV leaves open the possibility
for commonly cultivated plants in remote parts of the world to be deemed "new,"
provided they have never been disposed of or sold, because prior cultivation does
not defeat novelty.53 For example, Plant T is a commonly found herb in India
(like Tulsi).54 Owing to its abundant availability, Plant T is rarely sold but it is
commonly found in most backyards. Because of local faiths and beliefs,
assume that the leaves of Plant T are also commonly exchanged between people.
Nevertheless, under UPOV, Plant T plant may qualify as new (assuming that
Plant T has not been sold or disposed of and the species is yet unclassified).56 The
bottom line is, novelty may not be barred under UPOV for well-known plants that
are commonly exchanged between people, unless the exchange fits within the
definition of sale or disposal (and the species has been classified). Moreover, an
existing variety may qualify as new, where a country extends UPOV protection to
a genus or species covering that variety for the first time, even if it has been sold
one year before the date of application in the country of application, or before
four years in any other country.57 Instead of contributing towards innovation in
plant breeding, the diluted novelty requirements could potentially result in plants
in the public domain clearing the novelty threshold. In order to be protectable,
51. UPOV, supra note 8, art 6 (specifying that on the date of application the subject matter sought to be
protected should not have been "sold or otherwise disposed of' in the territory of the Contracting Party earlier
than one year before that date and (ii) in other territories earlier than four years or, in the case of trees or of vines,
earlier than six years before the said date).
52. Mark Hanning, An Examination of the Possibility to Secure Intellectual Property Rights for Plant
Genetic Resources Developed by Indigenous Peoples of the NAFTA States: Domestic Legislation Under the
International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & Cown. L. 175, 235
(2004).
53. See UPOV, supra note 8.
54. The term 'Tulsi' includes a large number of species in multiple genuses, including "Shyama Tulsi, Rama
Tulsi, Karpoora Tulsi, Cheeni Tulsi and Mou Tulsi." Because the UPOV system of registration occurs at the
species level, Tulsi is not, per se, protectable. The use of Tulsi as an example is limited to the proposition that it
is a commonly found herb. Email from Dr. S. Nagarajan, Director-General, PPRVA, India to author (September
1, 2007) (on file with author).
55. Id.
56. Tulsi can now be found in flower markets in India, which would fall within the novelty threshold under
Article 6 of UPOV. Email from Dr. N. S. Gopalakrishnan, Cochin University, Kerala, India to authors (October
20, 2006) (on file with authors).
57. UPOV, supra note 8, art. 6(2); see also Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the
Politics of Plants'Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COM. L. 585, 615 (2003).
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such new varieties should clear the other requirements for protection.
2. UPOV's Distinctiveness Threshold
A uniform and stable variety fulfilling the novelty test must be distinctive
to become eligible for protection. All plants belonging to a specific genotype
and possessing characteristics of that genotype fall within the definition of a
variety.
Under Article 7 of UPOV, a variety is distinct if "it is clearly distinguishable
from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge at the
time of filing the application.,,58 Distinguishing the application material from
another "variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge" determines
distinctiveness.59 Under Article 14 of UPOV, a variety is a matter of common
knowledge if it has been the subject "of an application for the granting of a
breeders' right" or "has been entered in the official register of varieties, in any
country., 60 The Examination Guidelines released by the UPOV Secretariat in
2002 specify that the filing of an application for the grant of a breeders' right
renders that variety a matter of common knowledge if the application leads to a
grant of a breeders' right.61 Common knowledge can also be established from
commercialization or a publication with a detailed description of the variety.6 2
What would amount to a detailed description is very unclear and is left undefined.
The important aspect to note is that common knowledge of application material
(or application variety) is inconsequential for a finding of distinctiveness or
novelty. Application materials have to be compared with varieties in common
knowledge (i.e., registered or published) in order to pass the distinctiveness bar.
In effect, the application would fail the distinctiveness test only if the application
material is indistinguishable from a registered or published variety. Thus,
application materials (even those that are themselves commonly known) can pass
the test of distinctiveness provided they are distinguishable from any other
variety that is a matter of common knowledge. Similarly, application materials
can qualify as distinct even if they are indistinguishable from well-known or
commonly cultivated materials that are not officially registered. Both commonly
cultivated and well-known varieties that are indistinguishable from other widely
known species can qualify as "distinct," so long as close cousins of the variety do
not fall within the statutory definition of commonly known by the process of
registry or by application for breeders' rights.
58. Id. art. 7.
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 14.
61. General Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity, and Stability, and the Development
of Harmonized Descriptions of New Varieties of Plants, TG/I/3, § 5.2.2.1 (Apr. 19, 2002) [hereinafter UPOV
Guidelines].
62. Id. (emphasis added).
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The distinctiveness requirement in UPOV operates as a highly diluted version
of the non-obviousness requirements of the utility patent system.63 For instance,
Plant T from the above example will also qualify as "distinctive" under Article 7
of UPOV, so long as it is distinguishable from a variety for which an application
has been successfully made or has been entered in the official register. Plant T
will pass the distinctiveness bar even if it is indistinguishable from a commonly
cultivated and well-known Plant B, provided that no application for protection or
registry has been successfully made for Plant B. In essence, common knowledge,
use, or even repeated cultivation of the application material is not an impediment
for qualifying as "new" and "distinct" under UPOV.
Even with this low standard of distinctiveness, the Examination Guidelines
specify that a systematic individual comparison with all varieties in common
knowledge may not be required.6' For example, the 2002 Guidelines specify that,
where a candidate variety is sufficiently different in its characteristics, it is
unnecessary for a systematic individual comparison with varieties in that group
to determine distinctiveness of the candidate variety.65 It is adequate if just one
quality distinguishes the application material from similar varieties of the same
genus or species.66
The low standard of novelty and distinctiveness may result in both well-known
varieties and those trivially different from them being considered distinct. When
read with the standard of novelty, a commonly cultivated and well-known variety
can be novel and distinct under UPOV, as long as it has not been sold or disposed
of within the statutory periods, and is distinguishable from other varieties that
appear in a registry or for which an application has been made. UPOV notwith-
standing, attempts to monopolize well-known varieties by using various IP
means, particularly patents, as tools, has already resulted in rampant erosion of
the public domain. The patenting of Ayahuasca, a brew known as the yage or Yaje
in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, prepared from a plant called the vine
banisteriopsis caapi serves as an example. U.S. Plant Patent No. 5751 and 5752
(issued on June 17, 1986) on Ayahuasca to Loren Miller of the International Plant
Medicine Corporation was revoked in 1999.67 Additional examples, like the
63. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (requiring patent applications to determine the "differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains").
64. Id. § 5.3.1.1.
65. Id.
66. Nwabueze, supra note 57, at 615.
67. See generally ESTELLE Do~is LONG & ANTONY D'AmATrro, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY
1056 (2000). See Glenn M. Wiser, PTO Rejection of the Ayahuasca Patent Claim, Center For International
Environmental Law (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/ptorejection.html (noting that a
request for reexamination was filed on March 30, 1999). The PTO rejected Miller's patent claim in an Office
Action dated November 3, 1999 under the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102(b) prohibits, inter alia, the issuance
of a patent when the invention was patented or described in a printed publication more than one year prior to the
date of patent application. The rejection was based on the Herbarium sheets from the Field Museum in Chicago
20071
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
patents on turmeric and neem, plants both used in India for several years,
substantiate the need to close any loopholes that facilitate any form of protection
for varieties in the public domain.
The disadvantage with the low standard of distinctiveness is that UPOV
can elevate miniscule innovations to the level of an invention. When read
with the lowered novelty standards, UPOV can dangerously promote protec-
tion for non-innovation, as well as for miniscule innovations. Importantly,
protecting miniscule innovations unjustly enriches the breeders by depleting
prior art, which, in this case, is biodiversity material. The danger, as already
mentioned, is that it could result in appropriating genetic material from the
public domain and protecting it as premium innovation. Consequently,
countries that seek to prioritize biodiversity protection would have to tailor a
regime with higher standards of novelty and distinctiveness than those
created in the 1991 UPOV.
3. UPOV's Uniformity & Stability Requirements
A variety that is novel and distinct should also be "uniform" and "stable" in
order to qualify for protection.6" A variety is uniform if, "subject to the variation
that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is suf-
ficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics., 69 The Guidelines add that JPOV
links this uniformity requirement to the particular features of a variety's propaga-
tion.7 ° After successive production or propagation, if a new variety retains its
essential characteristics, then it is taken to be stable.7 ' In effect, uniformity is
achieved if all plants of the same variety possess identical characteristics, and
stability is achieved if these characteristics remain unchanged during propaga-
tion. The criterion of uniformity and stability have been included to ensure
reproducibility of later generations.
On the other hand, UPOV's encouragement for protecting stable and uniform
varieties can undermine genetic diversity by promoting monocultures.. Hence, a
UPOV based legislation would be a misfit for countries whose national objectives
include sustainable use of biodiversity or equitable benefit sharing.72 In fact,
developing country signatories of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
73
containing specimens of B. caapi. The Herbarium sheets were recognized as 'printed publications' for the
purpose of determining patentability. See also Bob van Dillen & Maura Leen, Biopatenting and the Threat of
Food Security-A Christian and Development Perspective (2000), http://www.cidse.org/pubsltglppcon.htm.
68. UPOV, supra note 8, art. 8-9.
69. Id. art. 8.
70. UPOV Guidelines, supra note 61, § 6.3.
71. Nwabueze, supra note 57, at 615.
72. Cary Fowler, By Policy or Law? The Challenge of Determining the Status and Future of Agrobio-
diversity, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 23 (1997).
73. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD]. The CBD was
signed at the United Nation's Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 and came into force on
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highlight UPOV's inconsistency with the CBD objectives of conserving biologi-
cal diversity.74 For instance, Article 15 of the CBD requires "sharing in a fair and
equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources., 75 Embracing
UPOV would run counter to the CBD doctrine of equitable sharing of the
technology and traditional knowledge of indigenous or local communities.7 6
Furthermore, genetic diversity is also important for farmers who depend on the
stability and dependability of production offered by genetic heterogeneity.77
Other critics point out that uniformity could result in vulnerability to pests.
78
While the IP of plant breeders should be protected, such protection need not be
made to the detriment of traditional farming techniques.7 9 Traditional farming
promotes adaptability of crops to many different conditions by selecting seeds
tailored to many different microenvironments. ° Selection diversifies the plant
varieties available in a given area. Essentially, the criticism is that UPOV
promotes commercially profitable varieties, but the resulting loss of agricultural
diversity affects socially valuable varieties.8" Ultimately, UPOV's step-motherly
treatment towards farmers leaves the core concerns of developing nations
unaddressed.
4. UPOV'S Exaggerated Scope of Breeders' Rights
The low thresholds for eligibility standards in UPOV are coupled with
December 29, 1993. The CBD addresses the need for an international framework to beneficially exploit and
conserve biodiversity. Thus, the CBD is the international treaty conceived as a tool to promote sustainable
development. The Convention has three important objectives: first, the conservation of biological diversity;
second, promoting sustainable use of biodiversity components; and, lastly, sharing benefits from biodiversity
resources in exchange for transfer of technology.
74. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note by the Secretariat: Review of the
Provisions ofArticle 27.3(B) Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, IP/C/W/369, 54 (Aug. 8, 2002).
75. CBD, supra note 73, art. 15.7.
76. Id. art. 80) ("Subject to its national legislation [each party shall] respect, preserve, and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous or local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promise their wider application
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.").
77. Select Committee on Environmental Audit, Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, 1999-2000, H.C. 45,
Appendix 7; see also Beyond UPOV supra note 48; see also John Linarelli, Treaty Governance, Intellectual
Property and Biodiversity, 6 UNIV. OF LA VERNE ENviRo. L. REV. 21, 26 (2004).
78. See generally Thomas Peterson & Bryony Bonning, Trait Protection System: A Case Study, http://
www.bioethics.iastate.edu/classroom/traitprotection.html. See also George Van Esbroeck & Daryl T. Bowman,
Cotton Germplasm Diversity and Its Importance to Cultivar Development, 2 JOURNAL OF CoTroN ScIENCE 121
(1998), available at http://www.cotton.org/journal/1998-02/3/upload/jcsO2-121 .pdf.
79. CBD, supra note 73, art. 80).
80. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical
Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 McH. J. INT'L L. 919, 941 (1996).
81. Charles R. McManis, The Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental
Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 276 (1998).
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excessive rights for breeders. Breeders' rights, by virtue of Article 14(5)(a) of
UPOV, extend to both the protected variety and "varieties not clearly distinguish-
able" from the protected variety.82 The rights conferred in the article afford breeders
rights over varieties that are not clearly distinguishable from the protected and
harvested materials. Further, Article 14(5)(b) extends breeders' rights to "essentially
derived varieties." 83 "Essentially derived varieties" are varieties derived either from the
protected variety, or from another variety that is predominantly derived from the initial
protected variety, and are clearly distinguishable from the initial variety.a4 Basically,
essentially derived varieties are the first or second generation derivatives from the
protected varieties. Thus, breeders' rights extend to varieties that are not clearly
distinguishable (by virtue of Article 14(5)(a)) as well as varieties that are clearly
distinguishable (when read with Article 14(5)(b)) derivatives of the protected variety.85
The only meaningful exception in UPOV is the the use of a protected variety
for experimentation. But, even here, if the experimentation on a protected variety
results in another variety, the breeder of the protected variety has rights over the
resulting variety, even if it is clearly distinguishable from the protected variety.
Assume, for example, that Farmer, using the personal experimentation allowance
under Article 15, derives Berry Y, which is not clearly distinguishable from the
protected variety, Fruit X. Then, Farmer derives Pea Z from Berry Y Even if Pea Z
is clearly distinguishable from both Fruit X and Berry Y, breeders' rights over
Fruit X under UPOV extend to both Berry Y and Pea Z. Thus, UPOV allows
breeders to claim rights over the experimental varieties of other farmers and
breeders, even where the result is clearly distinguishable from the protected variety.
86
C. UPOV'S IMBALANCED FARMERS' & BREEDERS' RIGHTS
1. Farmer & Researcher Exceptions
UPOV's biggest flaw is the lack of any recognition of farmers' rights. In
countries with large agrarian societies, introducing a UPOV-type legislation
would amount to statutory marginalization of farmers. Two important issues arise
with reference to farmers' rights. The first relates to traditional rights of farmers,
like the right to re-sow, applicable to new varieties. The second relates to the
rights of farmers who provide source information which results in a new and
protected variety. Both issues are not fully addressed in UPOV. Instead, UPOV, is
fashioned as a mechanism for breeders' rights, and therefore treats "rights" of
other players in agricultural trade as exceptions to the breeders' right.87 Thus,
82. UPOV, supra note 8, art. 14, § 5(a).
83. Id. § 5(b).
84. Id.
85. Id art. 15, § l(H).
86. See id. art. 14.
87. See generally Robyn Ott, Protection of Plant Varieties and the Farmer's Rights Act, 2 OKLA. J. L. &
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farmers' rights are outlined as part of the exceptions to breeders' rights under
Article 15 of UPOV, which discusses two types of exceptions: compulsory and
optional.88 Compulsory exceptions include acts done (by farmers or researchers)
for private, non-commercial purposes and experimental purposes. Breeders,
however, can override these exceptions by conditioning initial access to the
protected variety on forfeiture of farmers' rights. In developing countries where
literacy among the farming community is limited, it can result in farmers
forfeiting more rights than they intend to. Unfortunately, the forfeitable rights are
important to allow farmers and farming communities to maintain agro-
biodiversity conservation and innovation at local levels.89
Furthermore, Article 15 of UPOV limits the ability of governments to provide
for farmers' rights. Governments may provide farmers' rights only 'within
reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the breeder's legitimate
interests."9 ° These limitations prevent governments from making concessions to
farmers that would effectively balance welfare with trade. In failing to adequately
provide for balancing welfare and trade, UPOV defies the basic reason why
developing countries embraced a sui generis system. Nowhere is such a balance
more important than in agrarian third world countries where farmers generally
belong to the poorer societal classes.
2. Public Interest Exception
Article 17 of UPOV 1991 provides a weak public interest exception. The term
"public interest" is not defined, nor does the treaty indicate who determines when
the "public interest" is affected. Defining the term "public interest" will allow
countries to know when they can benefit from the applicable flexibility, and thus
avoid potential disagreements between members on the question of which
situations warrant the use of the exception. 9' Whether a welfare issue detrimen-
tally affecting farmers per se qualifies as a public interest requirement remains
unresolved, even assuming a substantial population is dependant on agriculture.
Determining the limitations on breeders' rights in "public interest" using clear
definitions is crucial to avoiding the maladies that developing nations previously
faced with respect to pharmaceutical patents.92 Based on the obstacles that the
TncH. 14 (2004).
88. UPOV, supra note 8, art. 15.
89. Dr. Philippe Cullet & Radhika Kolluru, Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights-Toward a
Broader Understanding, 24 DELH LAW REvIEw 41, 55 (2003), available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/
a0304.pdf.
90. UPOV, supra note 8, art. 15, § 2.
91. Critiques assert that allowing brown-bagging along with adequate public interest exception would result
in breeders being unable to recoup investments. When a public interest exception is applied, the underlying
assumption is that the public's need for the innovation (the seed in this case) outweighs the breeder's rights to
monopoly profits. See e.g. infra Part VII, (discussing compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals).
92. Article 31 of TRIPS allowed developing nations the right to compulsorily license patented medication.
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pharmaceutical patents dispute continues to present to developing nations, these
nations have a potent interest in demanding term clarifications under UPOV.
93
UPOV's biggest deficiency is its inability to move away from the patent
model. The IP style protection tends to reflect a bias in favor of large-scale
commercial agriculture. 94 The model in UPOV over-appreciates the role of
breeders, which could disadvantage farmers, biodiversity management, and
traditional knowledge protection.95 Styled as a softer patent regime, the 1991
UPOV represents a shopping list of what farmer and local communities do not
want.9 6 For instance, UPOV does not recognize saving (re-sowing) protected
varieties for re-use as an absolute right and allows contracting parties to limit
re-sowing.97
In any case, it would be unwise for developing nations to embrace a model
whose effectiveness is at best questionable, especially when there is a choice in
structuring a national regime. Therefore, developing nations are well advised to
establish a self-serving sui generis regime that treads a balanced approach to
plant protection.
III. INDIA'S PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION REGIME
After independence, the government of India adopted a model of confining
plant breeding to the public sector to address national food security issues .98 The
model succeeded when at the end of the 1970s, India graduated from being an
But, in 1997, when the South African government attempted to use the Article 31 exception because of a threat
to public health from AIDS, developed nations objected. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, Can't We All Get
Along - Case For a Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIz. ST. L. J. 117 (2003) (discussing the issues arising
therefrom.)
93. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, To Sow or Not to Sow: Dilemmas in Creating New Rights in Food,
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEDS OF CHANGE 318, 337-338 (J.Kesan ed.,
2007).
94. Cullet, supra note 43, at 100 (highlighting that in the 1991 version of UPOV, the distinction between
PBRs and patents is blurred). See also Nwabueze, supra note 57, (highlighting that UPOV provides monopoly
rights that are more watered-down than patents but are based on exactly the same premises).
95. See Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and Trade: The Quest for TRIPS, and
Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & Comp. L. 79, 106 (2002) (explaining that UPOV "is very
generous to the corporate plant breeder and sharply curtails farmers' rights.").
96. Gaia Foundation & GRAIN, Global Trade and Biodiversity in Conflict, Issue No. 2, May 1998,
www.grain.org/briefings/?id= 1.
97. See UPOV, supra note 8, art. 15(2) (outlining that each Contracting Party may, "within reasonable limits
and subiect to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the brer,... permit farmers to [protected seeds]
for propagating purposes, on their own holdings." The Diplomatic Conference of UIPOV recommends that this
exception "should not be read so as to be intended to open the possibility of extending the practice commonly
called 'farmer's privilege"'); see id., "Recommendation Relating to Article 15(2)" (recommending that this
exception "should not be read so as to be intended to open the possibility of extending the practice commonly
called 'farmer's privilege"').
98. Dr. N.S. Gopalakrishnan, An "Effective" Sui Generis Law to Protect Plant Varieties and Farmers'Rights
in India, 4 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 157, 158 (2002).
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importer to achieving self-sufficiency in food.99
India's move toward promoting agricultural trade was partly prompted by the entry
of foreign seed corporations into the Indian market in the early 1980s, which gave rise
to demands for IP protection.' ° Thus, the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers'
Rights Act (PPVFA) is generally perceived as an outcome of the pressures from India's
membership in the WTO, as well as entry of foreign corporations into the market.1°1
India, however, chose a sui generis structure to protect plant varieties with a view to
balancing the interests of all players in the national agricultural trade. The following
part examines whether India's PPVFA fulfills the effectiveness test under Article 27.3 of
TRIPS. In doing so, the paper also examines the Seeds Bill that was tabled in the
parliament in 2005. The Bill's highlight may be its notoriety due to allegations that it
attempted to dilute the benefits of the PPVFA.
A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIA'S PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES & THE 2004
FARMERS' RIGHTS ACT
The central tenet of the PPVFA is to address India's national concerns about
protecting the rights of traditional farming communities, while at the same time
promoting plant breeding by vesting IP protection. t°2 Thus, the PPVFA lumps plant
varieties into three protectable categories: (a) New Varieties, (b) Extant varieties, which
refer to existing varieties discovered for the first time, and (c) Farmers' Varieties, based
on community property concepts."°3 The effectiveness of the PPVFA can be examined
by understanding the layers of protection and determining whether the deviations from
UPOV falls within the ambit of TRIPS flexibilities.
1. New Variety
A variety is eligible for protection provided it is novel, distinct, uniform, and
stable.' 4 The requirement for novelty is similar to UPOV. Varieties not "sold or
otherwise disposed of' in India more than a year prior to filing, or outside India
for more than four or six years, depending on the type of plant, can pass the
novelty test. ' 05 Becoming "a matter of common knowledge" on the application
date, by methods other than by sale or disposal does not affect the novelty for
protecting new varieties.' °6 Like novelty, the definitions of distinctiveness,
99. India-Economic Development, Evolution of Policy, Sept. 1995, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/
query/r-6093.html.
100. Id.
101. The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 1999, No. 123, Acts of Parliament, 2000;
PPVFA, supra note 4.
102. See PPVFA, supra note 4, at Preamble.
103. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 15(2).
104. Id. § 15.
105. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 15(3)(a).
106. Id. § 15 (3) proviso.
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uniformity and stability also track UPOV 107 Any breeder, farmer, group, or
community of farmers may apply for registration of a new variety.'° 8
The distinction of PPVFA lies in the registration regime, which enables
protection for new varieties while at the same time recognizing the role of local
farmers. For instance, every application for registration must include a denomina-
tion of the variety and describe (1) the geographical origin of the material, and (2)
all information regarding the contribution of the farmer, community, or organiza-
tion in the development of the variety."° Further, the application must state that
all genetic or parental material used to develop the variety has been lawfully
acquired. ° Moreover, section 40 requires the breeder to disclose information
"regarding the use of genetic material conserved by any tribal or rural families in
the breeding or development of such [new] variety."'' The information in the
application is meant to facilitate benefit sharing, a system discussed below, introduced
to protect farmers rights. Unlike UPOV, the PPVFA bears a set of public interest
exceptions to registration of a new variety. A new variety, for instance, becomes
unregisterable if it is likely to deceive the public, hurt the religious sentiments of any
class or section of Indians, or cause confusion regarding the variety's identity, or is not
different from every denomination which designates a variety of the same botanical
species or of a closely related species registered under the Act.
1 2
While the farmer's role is protected by the benefit sharing arrangement, the
breeders' rights are protected using a combination of exclusive rights and harsh
penalties for infringement. The owner-breeder retains exclusive commercial
rights over the variety, once registered, including licensing, production, sales,
marketing, distribution, and importing and exporting. 113 The statute tries to deter
infringement by providing stringent penalties, at rupees 50,000 (roughly US
$1400) or imprisonment for a minimum of three months, which is also meant to
offer breeders the incentive to innovate without fear of infringement.!
1 4
2. Extant Variety
The introduction of farmers' variety and extant variety is meant to balance
breeders' rights with rights of other players in agricultural trade. The extant
variety typology itself was introduced to protect traditional knowledge and
indigenous rights." 5 The extant variety register serves as a compilation of
107. Id. § 15.
108. Id. § 16(1)(d).
109. Id. § 18(1)(e).
110. Id. § 18(l)(h).
111. Id. §40.
112. Id. §15(4).
113. Id. § 28.
114. Id. § 70.
115. Id. § 14(b).
[Vol. 20:97
PLANT PROTECTION IN INDIA
matters known and existing in the public domain. In essence, an extant variety
encompasses a farmers' variety, or a variety about which there is common
knowledge, or a variety in the public domain, as well as any variety included
under section 5 of the Seeds Act.'
6
Considering that the extant variety register is a log of materials in the public
domain, the registration requirements are not rigorous. For instance, extant
varieties need not be novel, although the requirements of distinctiveness, unifor-
mity, and stability are regulated by administrative notifications." 7 By making
farmers' variety a subset of extant variety, the PPVFA encourages farmers to
register varieties they have cultivated for years to ensure that they are not
appropriated. The most important benefit is that registration or compilation of
extant varieties creates a higher standard for distinctness and non-obviousness for
registering "new" varieties. Thus, it prevents protection of miniscule innovations
by breeders. To that extent, the PPVFA deviates from UPOV by creating a more
rigorous mechanism to maintain the uniqueness of the protected varieties.
An extant variety may be registered by a breeder, farmer, a community of
farmers, a university, or a public sector." 8 Although a breeder can register an
extant variety, he is not entitled to exclusive rights over the variety." 9 Section 28
of the Act provides that the Government, as the owner of the extant varieties,
enjoys the rights to determine their production, sale, marketability, distribution,
importation or exportation.' 20 The objective is to protect biodiversity by empow-
ering the government to negotiate with entities that require biodiversity materials
for creating biotechnology innovations. Interestingly, section 24 loosely creates
the right to exploit an extant variety (biodiversity material), over specific
applicants, for a term of up to 15 years from the date of publication. 121 In doing
so, it prevents any private acquisition of materials in the public domain. Taking
the Ayahuasca example above, 122 registering the plant would enable researchers
to work with it, but would prevent a Loren Miller-type patent over the plant itself.
Since any person can make an application for registration of an extant variety
under section 16, it allows the government to grant rights to the applicant for
exploiting the variety for a specified period. The disadvantage with the extant
registration is two fold: First, imposing a term of protection for extant varieties
creates the impression that matters in the public domain are not available in
perpetuity. Second, allowing any third party to register an extant variety could
presumably leave some species in the public domain unregistered. Plants that are
116. Id. § 20).
117. Id. § 15(2).
118. Id. § 14.
119. Id., § 28.
120. Id.
121. Id., § 24(6)(ii).
122. See, Long & D'Amanto, supra note 67.
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not commercially usable or being used may never be registered, leaving the
registry incomplete. In any case, it seems impossible to expect that the system
would result. in registration of all plants in the public domain.
3. Farmers' Variety
The PPVFA defines "farmers" from a community rights perspective as those
who "cultivate crops by cultivating the land," and those who supervise cultiva-
tion directly or indirectly through other people, or anyone who "conserves and
preserves, severally or jointly, with any other person ... through selection and
identification of their useful properties." 1
23
A "farmers' variety" is one "which has been traditionally cultivated and
evolved by the farmers in their fields, or is a wild relative or land race of a variety
about which the farmers posses the common knowledge."' 2' 4 The emphasis on
common knowledge strengthens community rights-a concept ignored by UPOV.
As far as determination of novelty and distinctiveness for registering a new
variety is concerned, a variety becomes a matter of common knowledge only if it
is protected or registered in any convention country. 125 All other forms of
common knowledge may not defeat novelty or distinctiveness. For all other
purposes (including for the definition of farmers variety), the term common
knowledge has been left broadly undefined. Notably, even though the definition
of novelty and distinctiveness track UPOV, the overall protection regime envis-
aged under the Act alleviates some of the concerns.
The manner of stylizing protection of farmers' variety reflects a keen sense of
consideration for community and traditional rights by including provisions for
benefit sharing, community compensation, immunity from prosecution for in-
nocent infringement, and the creation of a Gene Fund to collect breeders'
annual fees. 126 Each of the rights (discussed below), not only represents a
deviation from UPOV, but also showcases rights contoured to suit unique
national conditions.
Critics point out that separately categorizing a farmers' variety creates eco-
nomic inefficiency in prosecuting claims for registration because farmers may be
breeders and vice-versa. 127 However, while a farmer can be a breeder qualifying
to register a new variety, a community of farmers that creates a new variety, for
instance, will not qualify for registration of the breeders' variety. The breeders'
variety is based on the western notion of IP rights. The important aspect of a
farmers' variety is not to appease farmers, but to create community property
123. Id. § 2(k) (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 2(1).
125. Id. § 15(3)(a) proviso.
126. PPVFA, supra note 4, §§ 39-46.
127. Memorandum from vasudha J. Mehta, ALG India Law Officer, UPOV India and the World-Common
Knowledge and Uncommon Wisdom, 2 (on file with author).
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rights in contrast to the breeders' variety. The critics, however, may be vindicated
when considering that farmers' variety is a subset of extant variety. While the
extant variety encompasses everything in the public domain, farmers' variety is
limited to materials traditionally cultivated by farmers or over which farmers
possess common knowledge. To that extent, creating two different systems of
registrations could result in operational issues in the the future.
4. Other Deviations from UPOV
The most significant features of the PPVFA lie in areas where it deviates from
UPOV. As discussed below, these deviations contribute toward increasing the
effectiveness of PPVFA.
a. Protecting Biodiversity
The PPVFA emphasizes traditional farming practices to protect biodiversity.
Farmers are encouraged under the statute to conserve and improve genetic land
resources.128 The statute establishes a Gene Fund to reward farmers whose
existing variety or material is used as a source to create a new variety. 129 The
Gene Fund is a common fund created by the Central Government for the benefit
of the farmers.' 3 Monies collected as royalties, funds collected towards benefit
sharing, and other sums that become due to farmers will be credited into the Gene
Fund.' 3' The Central government will use the fund towards "expenditures for
supporting the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources including
in-situ and ex-situ collections and for strengthening the capability of the village
Panchayats for carrying out such projects.'"'
32
Moreover, if a farmer breeds a new variety, it would be subject to same levels
of protection and obligations, like benefit sharing or community rights. 133 If a
breeder derives an essentially derived variety from a farmer's variety, then the
breeder of the protected variety needs the permission of the farmer or the
community to commercialize the essentially derived variety. 13 4 The underlying
assumption is that any efforts that result in benefit sharing should be used to
encourage genetic diversity. '3 Thus, the statute promotes innovation while at the
same time rewarding the farmers and protecting biodiversity.
128. See PPVFA, supra note 4, § 39 (outlining that a farmer engaged "in the conservation of genetic
resources of land races and wild relatives of economic plants and their improvement through selection and
preservation shall be entitled in the prescribed manner for recognition and reward from the Gene Fund").
129. Id. § 39.
130. Id. § 45.
131. Id. § 45(l)(a).
132. Id. § 45(2)(c).
133. Id. § 39(l).
134. Id. §§ 28(2),43.
135. Id.
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b. Right to Resow
The PPVFA's sui generis stamp is showcased by allowing farmers to retain
their traditional right to save and re-use seeds from their harvests. 136 A farmer
may "save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share or sell his produce" including
non-branded seed, even if it is a protected variety.137 With a view to facilitating
the use of the right by farmers, section 18 further specifies that every application
for a new variety be submitted along with an affidavit swearing that the protected
variety does not contain any gene or gene sequence involving terminator
technology. 138 The caveat to re-saving is that the farmer cannot use the breeder's
brand name when reselling second generation produce. 139 While the objective is
commendable, the poorly drafted language of the section can lead to misuse of
the provision. For example, extant seed varieties or farmers' varieties, which can
be re-sowed, can be branded to prevent reuse by farmers. Considering the high
level of illiteracy, whether a farmer can differentiate between new varieties and
extant varieties is unclear.
Termed sometimes as brown bagging, farmers' traditional right to reuse
protected varieties for re-sowing has been controversial.140 The 1991 UPOV does
not per se recognize the general right to re-use protected seeds, as discussed in
the previous section. 14 Breeders insist that farmers re-using protected varieties
take away a part of their rightful compensation for the second generation seeds.
The breeders' lobby and the seed companies have opposed the right to re-sow on
the grounds that it is contrary to principles of western IP systems. 142 Farmers, on
the other hand, treat re-sowing as their natural right.143 Non-governmental
136. See Suman Sahai, India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Act, Bridges Comment,
http://iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/SahaiBridgesYear5N8Oct200l.pdf.
137. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 39(1)(iv).
138. Id., § 18.
139. Id. § 39(iv) ("[A] farmer shall be entitled to save, use, sow, resow, exchange, share or sell his farm
produce including seed of a variety protected under this Act in the same manner as he was entitled before the
coming into force of this Act: provided that the farmer shall not be entitled to sell branded seed of a variety
protected under this Act").
140. Brown-bagging can comprise two different scenarios. The first is the unauthorized sale of seeds that are
properly labeled, and genetically as-advertised. The second scenario is the case where seeds are sold under the
brand name, but the seeds are genetically not what they are purported to be. This second type of brown-bagging
often occurs when seed companies try to dispose of undesireable seeds in poorer markets and can potentially
add to the problems of brown-bagging by introducing the element of unfair competition in addition to the
infringement issue seen in scenario one. See Email from Dr. S. Nagarajan, Director-General, PPRVA, India to
author (September 1, 2007) (on file with author); see also PPVFA, supra note 4, [Sec.] 26.
141. See supra note 8, Part l(3)(A).
142. See Mehta, supra note 127, at 2-3.
143. Unlike in developed nations where seed companies and corporate farmers own large tracts of farmland,
most seed companies in India contract out seed production to small farmers who are then supervised by the seed
company. The seed companies benefit from this arrangement because they are able to avoid the costs and risks
of seed production and any tariffs associated with industrial production of seeds. Further, the small farmers are
able to obtain subsidies from the government for many of the agricultural inputs, such as water and electricity,
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organizations' (NGOs) like Gene Campaign assert that the right to resell is
important for farmers to maintain their livelihoods and for nations to remain
self-sufficient.14 5 For instance, farmers account for 87% of Indian seed produc-
tion. 146 Denying the right to resow would result in private corporations displac-
ing farmers as the country's major seed producers. In countries like India where
the farming population is considerable, it is important to make welfare exceptions
to maintain the balance between trade and welfare. By introducing the right to
brown bag, the PPVFA removes the most crippling impediment to introducing
formal plant variety protection in developing nations. The exception represents a
balance between fully allowing re-sowing on the one hand, and the UPOV
position tending towards preventing brown-bagging altogether.
c. Community Rights
Another significant deviation from UPOV lies in introducing a right to
community compensation in recognition of traditional knowledge contributions.
Basic intellectual property textbooks explain the philosophy behind the western
system by using the example of a researcher's invention resulting from cues
provided by indigenous people, educating the researcher of healing properties of
strange plants. 147 Western IP establishes that the indigenous people are entitled to
no compensation either based on the Lockean philosophy (sweat of the brow) or
the utilitarian philosophy that rewards the ultimate innovation. 148 Community
property rights, unlike the western IP regime, allocate rights to the tribe,
tribesman, or farmer as the case may be. Section 43 reflects community property
philosophy by providing that "[b]reeders wanting to use farmers' varieties for
creating essentially derived varieties cannot do not so without the express
permission of the farmers involved in the conservation of such varieties.'
149
Thus, communities can stake a property claim against breeders if a new variety is
derived from information or a contribution made by the local community.150 If
the communities' claim for compensation is established, the breeder must deposit
which would not be available to a corporate farm. In order to collect the seeds, the seed companies offer the
farmers a price higher than the grain price for the seeds, which are then "cleaned, graded, greated, tested,
bagged, and sold back, with a premium price." The fact that these small farmers are intimately involved with the
production and deelopment of seeds for the seed companies has led many of these farmers to assume that
brown-bagging is acceptable and within their rights. Email from Dr. S. Nagarajan, Director-General, PPRVA,
India to author (September 1, 2007) (on file with author).
144. NGO's are often the most effective voices for the concerns of ordinary people in the international arena,
particularly at the United Nations.
145. Suman Sahai, India's plant variety protection and Farmers'Rights Act, 2001, CURRENT SCIENCE, Feb.
10, 2003, at 409.
146. Id.
147. PR MENELL Er AL., INTELLEcUMAL PROPERTY tN THE NEw TECHNoLOGICAL AGE (2003).
148. Id., at 4-5.
149. Sahai, supra note 145.
150. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 41.
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the compensation in the Gene Fund.
15 1
d. Benefit Sharing
"Benefit sharing" refers to the concept of sharing a proportion of the benefits
accruing to a breeder of a new variety with qualifying claimants who could be
indigenous groups, individuals, or communities. t52 The concept of benefit
sharing is close to the community rights concept detailed above. The statute
mandates that before registering any new variety, the statutory authority should
invite claims for benefit sharing.1 53 Persons or groups can respond based on two
criteria: a) the extent and/or nature of use of genetic material in the development
of the new variety, and b) the commercial utility and demand in the market of the
new variety.154 Only citizens of India or firms or organizations formed or
established in India are eligible to claim benefits.155
Some commentators claim that the benefit sharing rewards are disconnected
from the farmers, and cumbersome to implement. 156 Critics assert that farmers
may not be vigilant in applying for benefits considering social, economic, and
educational conditions of the local communities.157 Consequently, critics assert,
communities will be left uncompensated for breeder appropriations. Moreover,
the dearth of regional offices among the local communities could pose procedural
complications for farmers, requiring them to apply to remote offices. 158 The
practical solution is perhaps to authorize NGOs or government bodies to apply
for benefit sharing on a farmer's behalf.t59 Finally, Dr. Gopalakrishnan points out
that protection for local communities is inadequate because the breeder is not
required to show prior informed consent from the community from which he
obtained the traditional knowledge.160
e. Compensation for Spurious Seed
To protect farmers from overly optimistic breeders, the Act requires breeders
to disclose the expected performance. 161 Should the varieties fail to perform as
disclosed, farmers, as consumers, may seek compensation from the breeder. 162 A
151. Id.
152. Id. §§ 2(b), 26.
153. Id. § 26.
154. Id. § 26(5).
155. Id.
156. See Sahai, supra note 145, at 409-410.




161. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 39(2).
162. Id.
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statutory authority determines whether the breeder has made spurious claims, and
thus, whether the farmer is entitled to compensation.' 63 The objective is to ensure
that quality is not compromised in the zeal to market new varieties. The
advantage of the provision is that it forces breeders to conform to minimum
quality specifications and reduces the natural tendencies of big breeders to over
advertise. 164 Critics have, however, opined that the clause vests unlimited
discretion on the statutory authority.165 In reality, the statutory authority's
discretion may in fact be limited by the language of the breeder's terms of license
which will presumably embody adequate exceptions.
f Protection against innocent infringement
Another important protection outlined in Section 42, is against innocent
infringement of protected varieties. Innocent infringement, which is a defense
against infringement, requires proof of lack of knowledge or awareness of the
protected status of the material at the time of infringement. 166 Such proof can
include matters like the literacy level of the farmer or the lack of licenses written
in his local language. The exception is important considering that: a) farmers in
third world countries tend to be illiterate, with limited knowledge of their rights
and no knowledge of intellectual property mechanisms, and b) breeders are
generally ruthless in prosecuting infringement, innocent or otherwise. The case
of Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer from Bruno, Saskatchewan, demonstrates
the point.167 In 1998 the agro-business giant Monsanto sought $145,450 in
damages from Schmeiser for illegally planting its patented 'Roundup Ready'
canola seed. 168 Unmoved by Schmeiser's claim that the seeds blew onto his farm
without his knowledge from the surrounding farms, the Canadian Federal
(Appellate) Court agreed with Monsanto and awarded damages based on
Schmeiser's 1998 profits and the amount of technical fees for contracted use of
the seed. 169 The court reasoned that Schmeiser had a duty to destroy the protected
variety once he became aware of the infringement. 70 The Canadian Supreme
Court, though, set aside the award for account of profit but left the award for
technical fees. 17 1 While it is unlikely that Indian courts would impose a duty to
163. Id.
164. Id. § 39.
165. Sahai, supra note 145, at 410.
166. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 42.
167. Jill Sudduth, Where the Wild Wind Blows: Genetically Altered Seed and Neighboring Farmers, 2001
DUKE L. & Ttc. REv. 15 (2001).
168. Id.
169. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] 3 F.C.D. 35, modified, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
170. Id. (The Canadian Supreme Court set aside the award for account of profit, but left the award for
technical fees).
171. [2004] S.C.C. 34, revising in part [20021 F.C.A. 309; [2003] 2 F.C. 165, affirming [2001] F.C.T. 256;
[2001] 202 F.T.R. 78; See Jeremey DeBeer, Reconciling Property Rights in Plants, 8 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP.
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destroy, the exception can prevent breeders from being overly aggressive.
Furthermore, protection against innocent infringement is required to maintain the
social welfare and trade balance, considering the poverty levels of farming
communities in poorer nations. Moreover, local cultures in most poor countries
promote sharing, and hence, a certain level of innocent infringement should be
expected in third world countries. In such circumstances, imposition of a duty to
destroy or any equivalent duty, as outlined in the Percy Schmeiser case, would be
an unworkable solution considering the lack of sophistication among the farming
communities in poor countries.
Section 42 does away with the duty to destroy innocently infringed materials,
perhaps considering the harvest's nexus with the farmer's livelihood. As a
balancing mechanism, the statute places on the farmer the burden of proving
innocent infringement. 172 The innocent infringement exception is economically
efficient because the Indian courts are already over burdened. Furthermore, the
Canadian-style suits could generate huge protests from farmers. 17 3 The exception
is outstanding with a unique national flavor. The right to resow coupled with the
exemption from accidental infringement provides protection for farmers' way of
life.
g. Research Exemptions & Essentially Derived Variety
The PPVFA promotes research on protected varieties by allowing anyone to
use a registered variety for "conducting experiment or research" or as an "initial
source of variety for the purpose of creating other varieties. ' '174 The statute
however, requires authorization from the owner of the initial variety to derive the
second-generation variety.175 Such authorization is required only where "repeated use
of such variety as a parental line is necessary for commercial production of such newly
developed variety."176 The provision promotes research while preventing the premature
exploitation of protected varieties in the name of research.
PPVFA takes a position different from that of UPOV, which vests rights for up
to two generations of essentially derived varieties on the breeder. While the
PPVFA defines "essentially derived" similarly to UPOV, it additionally grants
rights over the essentially derived variety (EDV) to the farmer or breeder (second
generation breeder) who derived it, and not to the breeder of the initial variety,
1, 6 (2005) (specifically noting that the case nullified farmer's rights).
172. Id. 42(ii).
173. Shaila Seshia, Plant Variety Protection and Farmers'Rights in India:
Law-Making and the Cultivation of Varietal Control, Institute for Development Studies, http://www.ids.ac.ukl
ids/KNOTS/PDFs/EPWarticleShaila.pdf. See generally Press Release, Gene Campaign, Monsanto Wins in
Canada: Can it in India? (May 27, 2004), http://www.genecampaign.org/News/news-monsantocanada.htm.
174. PPVFA, supra note 4, § 30.
175. Id. § 28.
176. Id. § 30.
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unless the EDV was also developed by the breeder of the new variety. 177EDVs
can be registered provided they are accompanied by the required documentation.
Dr. S. Nagarajan, the Director appointed under the PPVRFA points out the
requirement that "the registered variety (NV+EDV1 +EDV 2) cannot exceed the
protection period of 15 years or 8 years, as the case may be." 178 He adds that the
statute has, in effect, "weaned the New Variety from that of the EDV."
h. Public Interest Exceptions & Compulsory Licensing
The PPVFA's public interest exception is wider than UPOV's and covers
protection of "public order or public morality or human, animal and plant life and
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment." 179 Similarly, varieties
embodying technology (including genetic and terminator technology), which
maybe harmful to the public or animals, are rendered unregistrable under the
statute. 8°
Tied closely with the public interest exception is the extensive compulsory
license provision. The provision is styled similarly to section 84 of the Patent Act
of 1970. At the end of three years, any protected variety can be subject to
compulsory licensing if the "reasonable requirements of the public for seed or
other propagating material of the variety have not been satisfied or that the seed
or other propagating material of the variety is not available to the public at a
reasonable price." 181 Price shall also be a consideration in determining whether
the reasonable requirements of the public are satisfied. The objective is to use
compulsory licensing as deterrence to keep market prices of protected materials
low.
While the PPVFA is not flawless, the statute showcases that farmers' and
breeders' rights can be adequately and concurrently protected.' 82 In a country like
India, ensuring food security by providing farmers' rights is important for
economic stability.1 83 The PPVFA's effectiveness lies in catering to the needs of
nations that prefer to promote innovations without threatening farmers' liveli-
hoods.' 84 TRIPS grants members the flexibility to prioritize farmers in shaping a
177. Id. § 23(6) ("The rights of the breeder of a variety contained in section 28 shall apply to the breeder of
essentially derived variety"). If the original breeder or company of the new variety develops an essentially
derived variety, prior informed consent is not required. Id.
178. E-mail from Dr. S. Nagarajan, Director-General, PPFVA, India, to authors (Sept. 1, 2007) (on file with
authors).
179. PPVFAsupra note 4, § 29.
180. Id. § 29(3).
181. Id. § 47; see also Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDiA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 53(1)(a) (2d ed. 1979).
182. But see Gopalakrishnan, supra note 98, at 3 (arguing that India should protect breedrer's rights using
patents and have a separate legislation for protecting farmer's rights and traditional knowledge).
183. Suman Sahal, India's New Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Act, GENE CAMPAIGN, 2001,
available at, www.ias.ac.in/currsci/feb 102003/407.pdf
184. Id.
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policy for plant variety protection. The PPVFA is exemplar in its ability to
capitalize on the flexibilities in TRIPS. India should now work on eliminating the
loopholes in the PPVFA. Strengthening the conceptual framework of the PPVFA
can result in an efficient sui generis model for plant protection tailored towards
national objectives.
B. THE SEEDS BILL, 2005
Historically, the seed sector in India was governed by the Seeds Act of 1966,
the Seeds Control Order of 1983, and the Seed Policy of 1988.185 The Seeds Act
of 1966 provides a regulatory framework, laying down minimum quality stan-
dards. An elaborate institutional coalition set up consisting of the Central Seeds
Committee, seed certification agencies, central and state seed testing laboratories,
seed analysts, and seed inspectors implemented this law.' 86 Only specified seed
varieties fall within the scope of the Seeds Act of 1966. Unspecified varieties fall
outside the scope of the legislation. Moreover, seed certification is a voluntary not
a mandatory process.
187
The emergence of the private seed sector rendered the Seeds Act inadequate in
several ways, prompting the New Seed Policy in 1988 and later, in 2002.188 The
Policy proposed to improve seed distribution networks, 189 establish adequate
infrastructure,' 90 and facilitate biotechnology initiatives and private participa-
tion.191 As part of the proposal, the Seeds Policy of 2002 sought to "regulate the
sale, import and export of seeds .... )192 During the same time, state govern-
ments began new initiatives to regulate the seed industry because of an increased
sales of spurious seeds. 193 Consequently, the Indian Agricultural Ministry intro-
duced the Seeds Bill in 2004 to regulate the market by replacing the earlier
enactment. 1
94
The Bill requires commercial producers and dealers of seed to register all
185. Id; see also Milind Murugkar, Bharat Ramaswami and Mahesh Shelar, Liberalization, Biotechnology
and the Private Seed Sector: The Case of India's Cotton Seed Market, Discussion Paper 06-05, Indian Statistical
Institute (Jan, 2006) available at http://www.isid.ac.in/planning/workingpapers/dpO6-05.pdf.
186. The Seeds Act, 1966, No. 54 Acts of Parliament 1966 (Dec. 29, 1966) available at http://agricoop.nic.in/
sublegiseedl966.htm#The%20Seeds%2OAct,%201966; Kavitha Kuruganti, This Seeds Bill Must Go, INDIA
ToIerHER (Jul. 6, 2006), http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/auglagr-seedbill.htm.
187. The Seeds Act, 1966, supra note 186.
188. National Seeds Policy 2002, § 4, http:l//agricoop.nic.in/seedpolicy.htm; see also M.R. Madhavan &
Kaushiki Sanyal, The Seeds Bill 2004, INDIA TOGETHER (June 4, 2006), available at, http://www.indiatogether.org/
2006/junlaw-seeds.htm.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 5.
191. Id. § 6.
192. Id. § 3.1.
193. Kuruganti, supra note 186.
194. Seeds Bill of 2004, supra note 15; see also Madhavan & Sanyal, supra note 188.
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marketable seed. 195 Transgenic seeds require additional clearance under the
Environment Protection Act, although no specific disclosure requirements are
included to qualify for registration.' 96 The lack of separate disclosure require-
ments for transgenic (genetically modified) seeds can lead to misuse by poten-
tially diminishing the distinction between existing and new (protected) varieties.
For instance, it can result in non-transgenic seeds in the public domain being
packaged with fancy brands, (which, by itself, is agreeable). The problem is,
since there is no requirement for disclosure of the status of the protected seeds,
when the Seeds Bill interacts with the PPVFA, farmers may not know that some
of branded seeds are not protected by IP rights. If they are not aware of the status
as protected or otherwise, farmers may avoid brown bagging seeds that are in fact
in the public domain.
Furthermore, the Bill requires all dealers of seeds to be registered. 97 Gener-
ally, over 80% of all seed used in India is grown, saved, stored, exchanged and
bartered by local farmers. 198 Considering that dealing with seeds was considered
a natural right of farmers for centuries, the Seed Bill may be unsuccessful in
getting all small farmers to register.' 99 Moreover, it is unclear whether one seed
producer may sell a seed registered by a third producer.2a° On a general reading,
the statute disassociates the registration requirements of the seeds from the
dealer, implying that any registered dealer can sell any registered seed. However,
no viable mechanism is being contemplated for a registered dealer to determine
whether a seed is in fact registered. Hence, the right of a third dealer to sell seeds
registered by other dealers or producers remains unclear.
The Seeds Bill's biggest flaw is that it has not been fully harmonized with the
PPVFA. The bill does not take into account the complexities that result from the
benefit sharing arrangements proposed by the PPVFA. Hence, the bill has not
fully addressed the issue of whether registered seeds of an existing variety and
farmers' variety can be sold without sharing the benefits with the community or
the farmers. Similarly, the Seeds Bill, unlike the PPVFA, does not embody a
provision for pre-grant opposition to register seeds.20 1
As for public interest exceptions, the bill specifies that registration may be
refused202 or cancelled in the public interest.20 3 The bill, however, lacks a
195. Seeds Bill of 2004, supra note 15, § 1(3); see also id. § 13.
196. Id. § 15.
197. Id. § 22(1) ("Every person who desires to carry on the business of selling, keeping for sale, offering to
sell, bartering, import or export or otherwise supply any seed by himself, or by any other person his behalf"
must be registered as a dealer").
198. See Srilata Swaminathan, The Seeds of Our Destruction, LIBERATION INDEX, http://www.cpiml.org/
liberation/year_2005/AugustO5/seedsbill.htm.
199. Seeds Bill 2004, supra note 15, § 22(1).
200. Madhavan & Sanyal, supra note 188.
201. Suman Sahai, Presentation, Indo-US Exchange, Intellectual Property In Agriculture (Dec. 2006).
202. Seeds Bill 2004, supra note 15, § 18.
203. Idat§ 16.
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provision to control price and regulate supply of seeds under public interest
conditions, unlike the PPVFA which has a relatively detailed compulsory
licensing provision. Moreover, the bill provides for a possible maximum term of
36 years of protection. Although registration under the bill does not grant any IP
property protection, it confers the right to market the seed. 2° Considering this, a
36 year period of market protection based on the application information (i.e., the
results of multi-locational trials) seems egregious.
The Seed Bill vests jurisdiction for initiating disputes regarding seed quality
and compensation for failure of expected performance with the consumer court
by implicating the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).2°5 Interestingly, the PPVFA
vests jurisdiction in the national statutory authority for issues relating to seed
failure. If the PPVFA has to act in concert with the Seeds Bill, it could create a
procedural mess because issues of seed quality would fall under the PPVFA to be
determined by the national authority, while the same issues under the Seed Bill
would go to the consumer courts. If a question implicates both the enactments,
it is unclear which authority will take up the matter or how the question would be
divided. Other commentators have criticized the idea of vesting jurisdiction with
the consumer courts as disadvantageous to farmers, requiring them to prove that
the underperformance of a crop is based solely on the poor quality of seed rather
than on a combination of factors, such as environmental conditions or human
206inputs. Furthermore, the critics assert that the district forums and
the state councils created by the consumer courts have limited expertise in
agriculture.2 °7
In short, the Seeds Bill is a shoddy piece of legislation that fails to tie in several
aspects of the Seed trade with the PPVFA. To the extent that one of the objectives
of the Seeds Bill is to maintain a balance between farmers and breeders, the
provision fails for want of clarity. The Seed Bill creates an unnecessary parallel
system of registration along with the PPVFA. Creating a parallel system can
result in negating the entitlements and protections previously granted to farmers
under the PPVFA.2 °8 NGOs have rightly pointed out such flaws in their attempts
to thwart the Seeds Bill. 20 9 Against the background of the PPVFA, which
balances IP protection for plant breeders, farmers, and indigenous communities,
the Seeds Bill is an ill-conceived legislative attempt lacking a clear purpose or
even the ability to tie in with already established provisions of the PPVFA.
204. See id., at § 13 ("No seed of any kind or variety shall, for the purpose of sowing or planting by any
person, be sold unless such seed is registered under sub-section (2)").
205. Seeds Bill 2004, supra note 15, § 20.
206. Madhavan & Sanyal, supra note 188.
207. Press Release, Gene Campaign, The Controversial New Seed Bill, http://www.genecampaign.org/
Publication/PressreleasefTHE%20CONTROVERSIAL%20NEW%20SEED%20BILL.pdf.




PLANT PROTECTION IN INDIA
CONCLUSION
From the time India gained independence in 1947, the various Indian govern-
ments have attempted to achieve national goals. The means the various govern-
ments used, such as promoting public sector research, have worked well to
achieve Indian national objectives. India's strength lies in choosing a balanced
approach that does not sacrifice national welfare and food security for political
expediency. Hence, India should continue to boldly embrace a system that works
within the confines of its national objectives. National considerations like
biodiversity protection, sustainable use and the recognition of community-based
rights are important issues that need not be sidelined to accommodate commer-
cial breeders.210 At the same time, commercial breeders need not be shunned just
because they are breeders. India should now strengthen the loopholes in the
PPVFA and tailor a seed policy that compliments the PPVFA. The enactment of
the PPVFA signifies what can be termed a cautious opening up of the agricultural
market to privatizing agricultural trade.
While privatization of food may increase consumer choice, aggressive privat-
ization can result in marginalizing those who practice traditional farming, which
in turn would increase the divide between the rich and the poor. It could also lead
to a monopoly over some important foods by one or more private players. In
order to derive the full benefits, privatization should be timed to compliment the
opening up of the international agricultural markets for existing players. Unfortu-
nately, as along as negotiations in agricultural subsidies fail, developed nation
subsidies are likely to displace the markets of farmers from poorer countries.
Developing nations like India have already shown their commitment to the trade
agenda by enacting the Patent Act in 2005 and the PPVFA in 2004. Now,
powerful developing countries should step up to ensure that local politics do not
cause rich developed nations to renege on their obligation to reduce agricultural
subsidies.
210. GRAIN briefing, supra note 9.
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